






Democracy in Times of Ochlocracy
Abstract
For some time now we have noticed an increasing scepticism regarding the effectiveness of 
democracy, and its ability to represent citizens through elections. Elections are the central 
mechanism of political decision taking. However, there is a clear tendency to exploit electo­
rial processes by populist politicians. The ancient ideal of paideia was to educate citizens by 
following a civic program. Its aim was to enable the citizen to exercise the civil rights and 
duties. Since the 1970s, however, we had observed two contrasting tendencies: a growth of 
individualization, and a ecrease of the level of civic education. In the 1990s populist politi­
cal parties entered the political scene of European democracies, some of which have man­
aged to establish a mob rule or ochlocracy (ὀχλοκρατία). Since then, ochlocratic parties 
have systematically intended to win the votes of politically less educated citizens by offering 
them a simplified political discourse. In fact, these parties have managed to neutralize the 
two­party system in many European countries. Thus they managed to block majority­based 
governments, forcing parties to form coalitions with ideologically opposing smaller parties. 
This has created a situation in which the “punishment vote” becomes the mean to gain the 






























stitutional	 players	 used	 in	 order	 to	 dominate	 institutions,	 and	 to	 gradually	
de-activate	democratic	processes.	We	will	characterize	the	dangers	and	risks	
associated	with	ochlocracy	and	show	possible	ways	of	solution.
1. Democracy in the New Millennium: 

















of	 information,	 and	 legally	 regulated	civil	 society	are	all	 essential	 require-
ments	for	democracy.	Our	occidental	understanding	of	democracy	is	that	of	


























































2. “Party-democracy” and Corruption
The	notorious	slogan	describing	corrupt	behaviour	clearly	reveals	the	modus 













The	 idea	 that	 substantive	 homogeneity	 and	
associated	 solidarities	 underlie	 democracy.	
See:	Schmitt,	1985,	14f.
2
Fractional	 intrigue	 and	 dynastic	 struggle	 re-
places	electoral	 competition	between	parties	































































































Spendenaff%C3%A4re	 (accessed	 on	 March	
16,	2016).
4
For	 PP	 scandals	 see:	 “Caso	 Gürtel”,	 avail-
able	 at:	 http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caso_
G%C3%BCrtel	(accessed	on	March	16,	2016);	




Aristotle’s	 classification	 is	 kingship,	 aristo­
cracy,	 πολιτεία,	 democracy,	 oligarchy,	 ty­
ranny.	 See:	 Aristotles,	 Pol.	 4,2.	 This	 was	
derived	 from	 Plato	 (Plato,	 Pol.	 302c)	 who	
arranged	the	six	(besides	 the	 ideal	polity)	 in	
pairs,	 kingship,	 tyranny–aristocracy,	 oligar-
chy–democracy,	good	and	bad.	Plato	had	no	
distinct	name,	except	δημοκρατία	παράνομος	
for	 bad	 democracy	 which	 Polybius	 called	
ὀχλοκρατία,	“mob-rule”.	Polybius’s	arrange-
ment	is	the	following:	kingship	(arising	from	
a	 natural	 despotism	 or	 monarchy)	 degener-
ates	 into	 tyranny.	 Aristocracy	 degenerates	
into	 oligarchy.	 Democracy	 degenerates	 into	
mob-rule.
6
“τρία	 μὲν	 ἃ	 πάντες	 θρυλοῦσι	 καὶ	 νῦν	
προείρηται,	τρία	δὲ	τὰ	τούτοις	συμφυῆ,	λέγω	
δὲ	 μοναρχίαν	 ,	 ὀλιγαρχίαν	 ,	 ὀχλοκρατίαν.”	
See:	Polybius,	1893,	Histories,	6.4.6.
7
“ἐκ	 δὲ	 τῆς	 τούτου	 πάλιν	 ὕβρεως	 καὶ	 παρα-
νομίας	 ἀποπληροῦται	 σὺν	 χρόνοις	 ὀχλοκ-








4. New Forms of Life in Society
At	 the	beginning	of	 the	21st	 century	 the	 rapid	 change	of	 the	 forms	of	 life	
that	go	along	with	the	new	forms	of	communication	are	noticeable.	Within	
a	relatively	short	period	mobility	has	increased	significantly.	Until	recently,	














director’s	 impropriate	 remark	 can	 destabilize	 the	whole	 bank,	 and	 thereby	























age.	Under	 the	 pretext	 of	modernization	 and	 an	 excessive	 national	 deficit,	
the	governing	party	refuses	to	fill	new	posts.	Consequently,	judges	and	a	re-
duced	number	of	staff	have	to	deal	with	more	workload.	This	leads	to	a	partial	
blockage	of	 the	 judicial	 system	whereby	deadlines	 are	 exceeded	 and	 legal	
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Our	working	hypothesis	 is	 this:	a	high	amount	of	ochlocratic	 reforms	pro-
duces	automatically	a	rise	in	black	economy.	We	assume	that	the	weakening	



























































As	we	 have	 described	 above,	 shadow	 industry	 produces	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	






7. Deliberative Democracy: 
  Strategy, Tactics and Logistics
An	attempt	 to	reduce	 legitimacy	can	also	be	seen	 in	 the	example	of	media.	
New	 communication	 technologies,	 such	 as	 cyberspace,	 internet,	 and	 infor-
mation	transfer	hold	the	risk	of	putting	politicians’	legitimacy	at	risk.	Nearly	






















would	have	happened,	had	he	not	been	 recorded,	 shows	 the	 importance	of	
control	in	politics.	Without	any	proof	his	party	could	not	have	dismissed	him.	
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Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Demokracija u vrijeme ohlokracije
Sažetak
U posljednje vrijeme moguće je primijetiti porast skepticizma prema efektnosti demokracije 
i njene mogućnosti zastupanja kroz sustav glasovanja. Izborni sustav središnji je mehanizam 
političkog odlučivanja. Međutim, očigledno je postojanje namjere zloupotrebljavanja meha­
nizama glasovanja od strane populističkih političara. Drevna ideja paideje bila je obrazova­
ti građane kroz građanski program. Cilj je bio omogućiti građanima izvršavanje građanskih 
prava i obaveza. Nakon 1970-ih godina, međutim, promatramo dvije oprečne tendencije: rast 
specijalizacije građana i opadanje općeg građanskog obrazovanja. Tijekom 1990-ih godina po­
pulističke političke stranke došle su na političku scenu europskih demokracija, među kojima su 
neke oblikovale vladavinu mase, odnosno ohlokraciju (ὀχλοκρατία). Otada, ohlokratske stran­
ke sistematski osvajaju glasove na temelju politički slabije obrazovanih građana obraćajući 
im se pojednostavljenim političkim diskursima. Štoviše, takve su stranke uspjele neutralizirati 
dvostranačke sisteme u mnogim Europskim zemljama. Uspjeli su blokirati vlade koje se zasni­
vaju na većini tjeranjem stranaka da oblikuju koalicije s ideološki suprotstavljenim manjim 
strankama. To je stvorilo situaciju u kojoj »kazneni glas« postaje način pridobivanja glasova 
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Demokratie zu Zeiten der Ochlokratie
Zusammenfassung
In letzter Zeit ist es möglich, den zunehmenden Skeptizismus gegenüber der Effektivität der 
Demokratie und ihrer Repräsentationsmöglichkeit durch das Abstimmungssystem zu bemerken. 
Das Wahlsystem ist der zentrale Mechanismus der politischen Entscheidungsfindung. Allerdings 
besteht offensichtlich die Absicht, dass die Wahlmechanismen seitens der populistischen Poli­
tiker missbraucht werden. Die uralte Idee der Paideia war, die Bürger durch ein bürgerliches 
Programm zu bilden. Ziel war es, den Bürgern die Ausübung von Bürgerrechten und Bürger­
pflichten zu ermöglichen. Nach den 1970er­Jahren beobachten wir jedoch zwei gegensätzliche 
Tendenzen: die zunehmende Spezialisierung der Bürger und den Rückgang der allgemeinen 
staatsbürgerlichen Bildung. In den 1990er­Jahren traten die populistischen politischen Parteien 
auf die politische Bühne europäischer Demokratien, unter denen einige eine Pöbelherrschaft 
bildeten, bzw. eine Ochlokratie (ὀχλοκρατία). Seitdem erhalten die ochlokratischen Parteien 
ihre Stimmen systematisch auf der Basis politisch untergebildeter Bürger, indem sie ihre Wäh­
lerschaft mit vereinfachten politischen Diskursen ansprechen. Darüber hinaus ist es solchen 
Parteien gelungen, Zweiparteiensysteme in vielen europäischen Ländern zu neutralisieren. Sie 
haben es geschafft, Mehrheitsregierungen zu blockieren, indem sie die Parteien dazu drängten, 
Koalitionen mit ideologisch entgegengesetzten kleineren Parteien einzugehen. Dies hat eine 
Situation geschaffen, in der „Strafstimmen“ eine Art Stimmengewinnung von unentschlossenen 




La démocratie à l’époque de l’ochlocratie
Résumé
Ces derniers temps, il est possible de remarquer une montée de scepticisme quant à l’effecti­
vité de la démocratie et à ses possibilités de représentation par le système de vote. Le système 
électoral est le mécanisme central de la prise de décision politique. Toutefois, il est évident 
qu’il existe une intention d’exploiter de manière abusive ce mécanisme de vote de la part des 
politiciens populistes. La conception ancienne de la « paideia » consistait dans l’idée d’édu­
quer les citoyens grâce à un programme de citoyenneté. Le but était de donner la possibilité aux 
citoyens d’accomplir leurs obligations et d’exercer leurs droits civiques. Toutefois, après les 
années 1970, on observe deux tendances opposées : un accroissement dans la spécialisation des 
citoyens et un appauvrissement de leur éducation civique générale. Au cours des années 1990, 
sont arrivées sur la scène politique les démocraties européennes des partis politiques populis­
tes, parmi lesquels certains ont façonné la règle de la foule, à savoir l’ochlocratie (ὀχλοκρατία). 
Depuis, les partis ochlocratiques gagnent des voix de manière systématique sur la base d’un 
discours politique simplifié destiné à des citoyens dont l’éducation politique reste modeste. De 
plus, ces partis ont réussi à paralyser le système bipartite dans de nombreux pays européens. En 
effet, en incitant les partis à former une coalition avec de petits partis idéologiquement opposés, 
ils ont réussi à bloquer des gouvernements formés à partir d’une majorité électorale. Ce qui 
a créé une situation au sein de laquelle « la voix de la condamnation » devient un moyen de 
gagner les voix des personnes encore indécises, que l’on peut décrire comme des insurgés sans 
culture politique.
Mots-clés
démocratie,	ochlocratie,	démocratie	délibérative
